阅读:2691回复:4
关于威金病毒
我在文件过滤系统中看到要打开一个文件,而且可以写,只有三种方式:FILE_OVERWRITE_IF FILE_OPEN_IF FILE_CREATE 我在测试威金毒时,发现他并没有通过这些操作打开.就可以感染文件.请问为什么.我想感染文件还要是写吧..对不.
不知道是有其它方法,还有??? 85 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_CREATE D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Attributes: N Options: Open 86 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 FASTIO_QUERY_STANDARD_INFO D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Size: 1454080 87 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 1454080 88 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 65536 89 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 65536 Length: 65536 90 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 131072 Length: 65536 91 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 196608 Length: 65536 92 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 262144 Length: 65536 93 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 327680 Length: 65536 94 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 393216 Length: 65536 95 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 458752 Length: 65536 96 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 524288 Length: 65536 97 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 589824 Length: 65536 98 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 655360 Length: 65536 99 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 720896 Length: 65536 100 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 786432 Length: 65536 101 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 851968 Length: 65536 102 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 917504 Length: 65536 103 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 983040 Length: 65536 104 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1048576 Length: 65536 105 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1114112 Length: 65536 106 17:03:52 System:4 IRP_MJ_CLOSE D:\QQ\QQAllInOne.dll SUCCESS 107 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1179648 Length: 65536 108 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1245184 Length: 65536 109 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1310720 Length: 65536 110 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1376256 Length: 65536 111 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1441792 Length: 12288 112 17:03:52 System:4 IRP_MJ_CLOSE D:\QQ\QQAddr.dll SUCCESS 113 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 FASTIO_READ D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 1454080 114 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 FASTIO_QUERY_BASIC_INFO D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Attributes: A 115 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 FASTIO_WRITE D:\QQ\QQ.exe FAILURE Offset: 0 Length: 104448 116 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 104448 117 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 FASTIO_WRITE D:\QQ\QQ.exe FAILURE Offset: 104448 Length: 1454080 118 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 104448 Length: 1454080 119 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 102400 Length: 65536 120 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 167936 Length: 65536 121 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 233472 Length: 28672 122 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 262144 Length: 65536 123 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 327680 Length: 65536 124 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 393216 Length: 65536 125 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 458752 Length: 65536 126 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 524288 Length: 65536 127 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 589824 Length: 65536 128 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 655360 Length: 65536 129 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 720896 Length: 65536 130 17:03:52 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 786432 Length: 65536 131 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 851968 Length: 65536 132 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 917504 Length: 65536 133 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 983040 Length: 65536 134 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1048576 Length: 65536 135 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1114112 Length: 65536 136 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1179648 Length: 65536 137 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_WRITE* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1245184 Length: 65536 138 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_READ* D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 1556480 Length: 4096 139 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 FASTIO_WRITE D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS Offset: 99828 Length: 744 140 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS FileBasicInformation 141 17:03:53 Logo1_.exe:1464 IRP_MJ_CLEANUP D:\QQ\QQ.exe SUCCESS 以上是filemon查看的. 下面附上威金病毒程序 |
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沙发#
发布于:2007-01-07 20:47
请各位老指点..谢谢
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板凳#
发布于:2007-01-09 13:13
可以绕过文件过滤驱动的,刚才在网上看到一篇文章说可以饶过去的,
4.绕过文件系统过滤驱动和钩子 有了第三部分的内容,我们目前可以直接给FSD发送请求操作文件。但是这还不够,因为有很多的杀毒软件或者监视工具使用FSD Filter Driver或者FSD Hook的办法来监控文件操作。在今天这篇文章里我讲一些原理性的东西,提供绕过FSD Filter Driver / FSD Hook的思路。 4.1对付文件系统过滤驱动 文件系统过滤驱动Attach在正常的文件系统之上,监视和过滤我们的文件访问。文件系统驱动栈就是由这一连串的Attach起来的过滤驱动组成。我们可以用IoGetRelatedDeviceObject这个函数来获得一个FileObject对应的最底层的那个功能驱动对象(FDO)。但是这样虽然绕过了那些过滤驱动,却同时也绕过了正常的FSD如Ntfs/Fastfat,因为正常的FSD也是作为一个过滤驱动存在的。磁盘文件对象的对应的最底层的FDO是Ftdisk.sys,它已经因为过于底层而不能处理我们投递的IRP请求。 其实正常的FSD信息存储在一个Vpb结构中,我们可以使用IoGetBaseFileSystemDeviceObject这个未公开的内核函数来得到它。它就是我们发送IRP的目标了。 4.2对付替换DispatchRoutine的FSD Hook 这是一种常用的FSD Hook方式。我们需要得到原本的DispatchRoutine,向原本的DispatchRoutine发送我们的IRP。这里提供一个思路:我们可以读取原本FSD驱动的.INIT段或者.TEXT段,查找其DriverEntry函数,在它的DriverEntry函数中肯定设置了自己的DriverObject的各个DispatchRoutine。在这个函数中我们就能找到我们想要的DispatchRoutine的地址。只需要使用特征码搜索的方法就可以搜索到这个值。 4.3对付Inline Hook DispatchRoutine函数本身的FSD Hook 这种Hook方法比较狠毒,但不是非常常见于安全产品中,一般应用在木马和rootkit上,比如我自己写的rootkit。它没有更改DriverObject里面的DispatchRoutine的函数指针,而是向函数开头写入汇编指令的JMP来跳转函数。对付它的基本思路就是读取存在磁盘上的FSD的文件,加载到内存一份干净的备份,察看我们要调用的DispatchRoutine开头的几个字节和这个干净备份是否一致。如果不一致,尤其是存在JMP,RET,INT3一类的汇编指令的时候,很可能就是存在了Inline Hook。(但要充分考虑重定位的情况。)如果存在Inline Hook,我们就把干净的函数开头拷贝过来覆盖掉被感染的函数头。然后在发送IRP,就不会被Inline Hook监视或篡改了。 http://www.xfocus.net/articles/200602/848.html |
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地板#
发布于:2007-01-17 19:53
各位高手,还在研究怎么对付杀毒软件呢?
还是先告诉我怎么解决掉这个病毒吧,用杀毒软件杀完重新启动,winRAR的图标就又变形了,苦恼啊! 我的邮箱是:jj_jiangjun@163.com 我在这里先谢过了! |
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地下室#
发布于:2008-01-18 15:06
学习学习!
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